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Book Reviews
COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: A CRITIQUE
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION. By David A. Strauss.1
Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. xviii + 150. $21.95
(cloth).
Brannon P. Denning

2

INTRODUCTION
Advocates for some form of original understanding as the
proper means for interpreting the Constitution managed to set
the terms of the interpretive debate for nearly the last three
decades. In part, their success is due to the perception that “it
3
takes a theory to beat a theory.” Indeed many liberal legal
scholars, Jack Balkin most recently, have simply decided to beat
originalists at their own game by invoking history to justify
Supreme Court decisions thought to be beyond redemption as a
4
matter of original understanding. Paraphrasing Jefferson, then,
5
are we all originalists now? David Strauss’s The Living
Constitution answers with a resounding No!
Since the 1996 publication of his article, Common Law
6
Constitutional Interpretation, Strauss has labored to create an
1. Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
2. Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. Thanks to Ben
Barton, Brian Bix, and the students in my Contemporary Constitutional Theory seminar
for comments on an earlier version of this article. Katie Terry provided helpful research
assistance.
3. For a version of this argument, see Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855 (1989).
4. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 549 (2009); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007).
5. Cf. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 14, 1801), in 1
INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 19 (2000).
6. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
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alternative to originalism. In a series of articles, he argued that
constitutional interpretation emulating the common law method
(hereinafter “common law constitutional interpretation” or
“CLCI”) is superior to originalism, both normatively and as a
7
description of what the Court, in fact, does in most cases. The
Living Constitution synthesizes his writings and provides, with
admirable brevity, an interpretive alternative to originalism.
After Strauss, no one can say that originalism’s opponents lack a
theory. The question rather is whether CLCI “beats” originalism
by compensating for the latter’s shortcomings without proving to
have theoretical shortcomings itself.
As I argue below, I think that Strauss’s case falls short. He
devotes little space to explaining what, exactly, CLCI is and how
it should be applied by courts. Strauss then contrasts CLCI with
a caricatured originalism that bears little resemblance to the
sophisticated theories of original understanding propounded by
scholars today. In Part II, I offer my critique. Specifically, I
question some of the assumptions underlying CLCI, note the
absence of any definition of the “common law method,” and
argue that his objections to originalism are not particularly
persuasive. Ultimately, I conclude that we do not have enough
information about CLCI to determine whether it is, in fact,
superior to theories of original understanding (as opposed to the
straw-man version of originalism Strauss offers) in most cases. A
brief conclusion follows.
I. THE CASE FOR COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Strauss lodges two main objections to originalism—the
undesirability objection and the impossibility objection.
Originalism is normatively undesirable because what we know
the Framers did intend is morally or politically unacceptable to
twenty-first century Americans. Originalism also requires
submission to the (often morally inferior) choices of men longdead and is undesirable for that reason as well.

REV. 877 (1996).
7. David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 845 (2007); David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and
Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003); David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech
and the Common-Law Constitution, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE
MODERN ERA 32 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002); David A. Strauss,
The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001).
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Originalism, moreover, is impossible because (1) it is
beyond the capacity of judges to discern what the Framers and
Ratifiers understood the words of the Constitution to mean; and
(2) even if judges could, they could not use those meanings to
decide contemporary constitutional controversies. Because
originalism is impossible, Strauss argues that judges who claim to
employ originalism are simply reading their policy preferences
into the Constitution.
In contrast to originalism, Strauss argues that CLCI is
workable, justifiable, descriptively superior, and candid. His
theory is workable because it is within the capacity of judges.
CLCI is justifiable because it relies on something other than
blind obedience to the past. Further, he argues, it is descriptively
superior because it reflects what the Court does and has done—
thus giving a better account of Court practices than originalism.
It is, he avers, the only source for real constitutional change in
our system. Finally, he argues that CLCI beats originalism on
candor because his theory is transparent and honest, as opposed
to opaque and obfuscatory—characteristics Strauss ascribes to
originalism.
A. THE UNDESIRABILITY OBJECTION
Originalism is defined by Strauss to be “the view that
constitutional provisions mean what the people who adopted
them—in the 1790s or 1860s or whenever—understood them to
mean” (p. 3). Originalism, Strauss argues, “is not consistent with
principles that are at the core of American constitutional law,
and, for the most part, originalists do not claim otherwise” (p.
8
17). On cue, Chapter 1 issues forth a parade of horribles—“what
we would have to give up if we were all to become originalists”
(p. 12):
 “Racial segregation of public schools would be
constitutional.” (p. 12).
 “The government would be free to discriminate against
women.” (p. 13).
 “The federal government could discriminate against racial
minorities (or anyone else) pretty much any time it wanted
to.” (p. 14).
 “The Bill of Rights would not apply to the states.” (p. 15).
8. By “American constitutional law,” of course, Strauss means the law as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
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 “States could freely violate the principle of ‘one person,
one vote’ in designing their legislatures.” (p. 15).
 “Many federal labor, environmental, and consumer
protection laws would be unconstitutional.” (p. 16).
Strauss also objects that originalism violates Jefferson’s
injunction that the earth belongs to the living. “One generation,”
he writes, “cannot bind another” (p. 24). “Why should we be
required to follow decisions made hundreds of years ago by
people who are no longer alive?” (p. 18). Twenty-first century
Americans have little in common with their ancestors of two
centuries past—in fact, we have more in common with “presentday residents of New Zealand[,] . . . [b]ut it would be bizarre to
suggest that we should let the people of New Zealand decide
fundamental questions about our law” (p. 24). So “[w]hy do we
submit to the decisions of the much more distant and alien
founders” (p. 24)? Strauss rejects any answer that depends on
“quasi-religious notions like fidelity,” and he argues instead that
we should “adapt[] the Constitution to modern circumstances”
when such adaptation is required (pp. 24–25). To the extent
originalism would prevent this, he argues that Jefferson’s
objection is “ultimately fatal to originalism” (p. 25).
B. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OBJECTION
Equally flawed, for Strauss, is originalism’s methodology.
“On the most practical level,” he writes, “it is often impossible to
uncover what the original understandings were . . . .” (p. 18). To
be done correctly, originalism means “judges have to be
historians”—better, in fact, because historians get to choose
what period of time that they study (p. 19). Lawyers and judges
“have no apparent qualifications for it,” and “there is no reason
to think that lawyers will be good at understanding the political
culture of a distant century” (p. 20). More often, lawyers and
judges produce law office history by picking and choosing among
uncertain evidence and seeing in it “what the judge wants to see”
(p. 20). By contrast, CLCI “requires judges and lawyers to be,
well, judges and lawyers” (pp. 43–44).
But even if history is available to judges and justices, it is
not much help because “we would be faced with the task of
translating those understandings so that they address today’s
problems” (p. 18). For example, Strauss asks about the Equal
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Rights Amendment to the Constitution (ERA): “Would the
ERA have abolished all-girls and all-boys public schools? Would
it have required public employers to give women pregnancy
leave?” (p. 19). He claims that no “‘understanding’ emerged on
questions like these. And if we cannot identify clear
understandings about something so recent, we have very little
chance of accurately uncovering the original understandings of
something like the Bill of Rights” (p. 20).
The inability of originalism to deliver what it promises
means that judges who purport to use originalism to fix
constitutional meaning are relying on something else—their own
values and preferences. Strauss assumes, for example, that
10
Heller can be explained not as a good faith disagreement over
ambiguous historical evidence but only as Justices invoking
history as a fig leaf to support their preferred policy positions on
gun control (pp. 20–21). Originalism, he concludes, “is not
actually a way of interpreting the Constitution. It is a rhetorical
trope” but one that has thrived for lack of a competitor (p. 31).
C. THE SUPERIORITY OF CLCI
Strauss argues that the Supreme Court does not usually
decide constitutional cases by a close reading of the text and
careful dissection of competing historical claims about textual
meaning. Rather, the Justices debate what prior cases require
(pp. 33–34). This common law approach is one “in which
precedents evolve, shaped by notions of fairness and good
policy” (p. 36). Strauss maintains that CLCI restrains judges
better than originalism (p. 36). In addition, he offers four
reasons to prefer CLCI to originalism: workability, justifiability,
descriptive superiority, and candor (pp. 43–44).
1. Workability—CLCI answers the impossibility objection to
originalism by embracing an interpretive method that is within
the professional competence of lawyers and judges. Unlike
originalism, Strauss argues, CLCI is workable because it only
requires judges and lawyers to be judges and lawyers instead of
historians (p. 43). “Reasoning from precedent, with occasional
resort to basic notions of fairness and good policy, is what judges

9. The ERA provided that “[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d
Cong. (1972).
10. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (invalidating D.C. gun
control ordinance on Second Amendment grounds).
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and lawyers do” (p. 43). It is, he argues, their comparative
advantage, not doing history. CLCI also answers part of the
undesirability objection—that originalism would produce
unacceptable results—because CLCI permits the introduction of
contemporary values necessary to update or “modernize” the
11
law.
2. Justifiability—For Strauss, CLCI also answers another
aspect of the undesirability objection to originalism: that it
requires subordination of the present to the dead hand of the
past. “The common law ideology gives a plausible justification
for why we should follow precedent” (p. 43). Instead of rooting
its authority in the command of some sovereign, the authority of
law under the common law approach “comes instead from the
law’s evolutionary origins and its general acceptability to
successive generations. Legal rules that have been worked out
over an extended period can claim obedience for that reason
alone” (pp. 37–38). The common law, in other words, can be
thought to embody the wisdom of the ages, as adjusted from
time to time by contemporary injections of “fair[ness]” or “good
social policy” (p. 38). By contrast, originalists “do not have an
answer to Jefferson’s question: why should we allow people who
lived long ago, in a different world, to decide fundamental
questions about our government and society today?” (p. 44).
3. Descriptive Superiority—CLCI, not originalism, Strauss
argues, represents the dominant mode of Supreme Court
decision-making. Most of the constitutional principles we take
for granted today came because the Court ignored original
intent. “In controversial areas at least . . . the governing principles of constitutional law are the product of precedents, not of
the text or the original understandings. And in the actual
practice of constitutional law, precedents and arguments about
12
fairness and social policy are dominant” (p. 44). In Chapter 3,
11. Cf. David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI.
L. REV. 859 (2009).
12. Strauss also notes that these important changes came as a result of judicial
decision-making, not constitutional amendment, leading him to conclude that formal
amendments “are actually not a very important way of changing the Constitution” (p.
115). He notes that the most important changes—flow of power to the federal
government, the rise of the administrative state, growth of presidential power—have
occurred in the absence of formal language in the Constitution (pp. 120–21). Moreover,
occasionally formal amendments have failed to produce the changes anticipated. The
Civil War amendments, for example, were all but moribund for decades after their
ratification (p. 127). Formal amendments are, in his estimation, neither necessary nor
sufficient to produce small-c constitutional change. The Court’s exercise of judicial
review is the dominant mode of constitutional change, he argues. For a longer version of
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for example, Strauss takes the reader on a Cook’s Tour of First
Amendment doctrine from the World War I-era Espionage Act
13
14
cases to the Pentagon Papers case (pp. 62–75) to illustrate that
“[t]he law of the First Amendment is a creation of the living
Constitution” (p. 76). “The central features of First Amendment
law were hammered out in fits and starts, in a series of judicial
decisions and extrajudicial developments, over the course of the
twentieth century” (p. 53). Concern with original intent is
noticeably absent in much First Amendment case law, he argues:
“[T]he text and the original understandings of the First
Amendment are essentially irrelevant to the American system of
15
freedom of expression as it exists today” (p. 55).
4. Candor—Finally, Strauss argues that CLCI “is more
candid” than originalism (p. 44). “The common law approach
explicitly envisions that judges will be influenced by their own
views about fairness and social policy” and that they have
“operated that way for centuries” (p. 45). He denies this means
that “judges can do what they want,” because they can only
operate in “the area left open by precedent, or in the
circumstances in which it is appropriate to overrule a precedent”
(p. 45). Originalists say that such appeals to judges’ personal
values are illegitimate; “[a]n originalist has to insist that she is
just enforcing the original understanding of” the constitutional
provision she happens to be interpreting (p. 45). But this, he
argues, “is an invitation to be disingenuous,” because of the
impossibility objection described above (p. 45). Many
controversial provisions are indeterminate and “it will be
difficult for any judge to sideline his strongly held views about
the issue” (p. 45).

his argument, see Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, supra note 7.
For a reply, see Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitutional
Amendments: A Response to David Strauss, 77 TUL. L. REV. 247 (2002).
13. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
14. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
15. For example, though addressed to “Congress,” the First Amendment applies to
the states and to the federal executive and judicial branches (p. 56). See, e.g., Mark P.
Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1156 (1986).
Moreover, historians have argued for decades over whether the freedom of speech
protected by the Amendment extended only to seditious libel (pp. 58–59). See generally
DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8–13 (3d ed. 2010) (providing a brief
overview of historical debates surrounding the purpose of the Amendment).
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D. AN ANTICIPATED OBJECTION AND A CONCESSION
In laying out the case for CLCI, Strauss anticipates one
objection to his method: that it is anti-democratic. He also
concedes that CLCI does not render either text or history
entirely irrelevant to constitutional law; it just does so for the
most controversial issues.
Strauss acknowledges that an obvious difference between
the traditional common law method and CLCI is that when
courts render decisions applying the former, legislatures are free
to overrule them by statute. “A decision about the meaning of
the Constitution, by contrast, cannot be reversed by Congress or
a state legislature; it can only be undone if the courts change
course, or if the Constitution is formally amended . . . .” (p. 46).
He denies that this charge of CLCI being anti-democratic is a
“fatal defect” in his theory (p. 46). The problem, as he sees it, is
not CLCI, but judicial review itself, “the practice of allowing the
courts to have the last word on most issues of constitutional law”
(p. 47). Further, there is the Constitution, which, by design, “will
sometimes prevent the majority from having its way . . . .” (p.
47).
For Strauss, once you accept constitutionalism, and the role
of the Supreme Court in settling disputes over its meaning, the
anti-democratic or counter-majoritarian charge loses much of its
force. “The common law is not intrinsically democratic or
undemocratic; it is a way of resolving legal issues” (p. 47).
Moreover, it is a way of resolving legal issues in the here and
now, involving new questions not previously considered.
Originalism is not any more democratic, he argues, because it
requires present-day majorities to submit themselves to the rule
of the long-dead. “Apart from that,” Strauss adds, “originalist
judges have to decide what those people’s will was about issues
that the people could not have anticipated—and that leaves
plenty of room for undemocratic rule by judges” (p. 49). He
adds, for good measure: “in any event, we do not have a purely
democratic system. We have a system in which the courts,
applying the Constitution, sometimes prevent the majority from
having its way” (p. 49).
Strauss concedes that text and history are sometimes
important—decisive even—in fixing constitutional meaning.
CLCI, in other words, does not mean that courts would be free
to “interpret[]” the age limits for elected officials to mean
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something other than the age given in the Constitution (p. 103).
He accepts that “one of the absolute fixed points of our legal
culture is that we cannot” simply ignore constitutional text (p.
103). “We cannot make an argument for any constitutional
principle without purporting to show, at some point, that the
principle is consistent with the text of the Constitution” (p. 103).
He devotes Chapter 5 to resolving this paradox: “a dynamic
common law constitution, and an unchanging but centrally
important text?” (p. 99).
Strauss argues that the text is important because “it
provides a common ground among the American people, and in
that way makes it possible for us to settle disputes that might
otherwise be intractable and destructive” (p. 101). The
Constitution settles any number of important issues regarding
the structure of the government and the existence of certain
individual rights that serve as starting points for debate. “The
central idea is . . . that sometimes it is more important that
matters be settled than that they be settled right” (p. 104). In
other words, text sometimes narrows or cabins the extent of our
disagreements with one another. So “the practical judgment that
following this text, despite its shortcomings” and not acquiescing
to dead hand control or even ancestor worship of the Framers is
why we follow the Constitution (p. 105).
In accordance with his “common ground” justification for
following the text, “the words of the Constitution should be
given their ordinary, current meaning—even in preference to the
meaning the framers understood” (p. 106). To do otherwise
would invite disagreement over the Framers’ understandings of
particular words, which, in turn, would frustrate the reason for
consulting the text—to narrow areas of disagreement and to
provide a focal point around which what Cass Sunstein called
17
“incompletely theorized agreements” could coalesce (pp. 106,
111). In other words, Strauss would like the text to “matter[]
most for the least important questions” (p. 110).
Using original understandings of provisions, moreover, robs
the Constitution of its particular genius, which for Strauss is that
16. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No person shall be a Representative
who shall not have attained to the age of twenty five years . . . .”); p. 103 (“No one
seriously suggests that the age limits specified in the Constitution for presidents and
members of Congress should be interpreted to refer to other than chronological (earth)
years because life expectancies now are longer . . . .”).
17. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev.
1733 (1995).
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the document “is specific where specificity is valuable and
general where generality is valuable . . .” (p. 112). It seems, in
other words, to invite the very common law approach that he
advocates. Originalism, on the other hand, “take[s] general
provisions and make[s] them specific,” ignoring “the framers’
genius . . . in their ability to leave provisions general . . . so as not
to undermine the document’s ability to serve as common
ground” (p. 113–14).
II. PROBLEMS WITH COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
In this Part, I lodge four related objections to Strauss’s
theory. First, Strauss’s references to the “common law method”
are very general; it is not clear, exactly, what is involved in
common law constitutional interpretation, or how we are to
evaluate whether it is being done well or poorly by judges.
Second, Strauss assumes, but does not defend, judicial
supremacy. That assumption, in turn, allows him to sidestep the
critique that the common law is a poor model for the Supreme
Court because its decisions may not be reversed by ordinary
legislative majorities. Third, the originalism with which Strauss
contrasts CLCI is a caricature. No originalist of whom I’m aware
holds the views Strauss ascribes to originalism. Further, Strauss’s
undesirability and impossibility objections to originalism are
either unpersuasive or overdrawn. The lack of a fine-grained
discussion of the common law method and his straw-man
originalism, in turn, make it difficult to say with any certainty
whether CLCI beats originalism (or any other theory) according
to Strauss’s own criteria.
A. WHAT IS THE “COMMON LAW METHOD”?
Strauss describes the common law as a system “in which
precedents evolve, shaped by notions of fairness and good
policy” (p. 36). It develops “over time, not at a single moment; it
can be the evolutionary product of many people, in many
generations” (p. 37). Its legitimacy stems from its “evolutionary
origins and its general acceptability to successive generations”
18
(pp. 37–38). The common law, he adds, “emerges from this
18. Another of Strauss’s assumptions is that the common law embodies a kind of
wisdom of the ages (p. 44). As Adrian Vermeule demonstrates in a book-length critique
of common law constitutional interpretation, though, these assumptions are highly
questionable. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON (2009).
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evolutionary process through the development of a body of
precedents” (p. 38). Where precedents don’t supply a clear
answer “the judge will decide the case before her on the basis of
her views about which decision will be more fair or is more in
keeping with good social policy” (p. 38). The common law
method requires the embrace of “humility and cautious
empiricism” on the part of judges (p. 40). “[W]hile the common
law does not always provide crystal-clear answers, it is false to
say that a common law system, based on precedent, is endlessly
manipulable” (p. 43).
Describing precedents as “evolving” and resulting principles
emerging from an “evolutionary process” make judges sound
almost passive, except when applying a dollop of fairness and
good policy in situations the precedents don’t address. But the
19
analogy to evolution surely obscures more than it illuminates.
Strauss never really tells us what this process of evolution looks
like or the judge’s role in it. Nor does he give clear indications
when precedents should be regarded as inapplicable, so that a
judge is free to fall back on her sense of fairness and good policy.
Compare Strauss’s silence to Edward Levi’s description of the
common law system: “the doctrine of precedent in which a
proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law
20
and then applied to a next similar situation.” Levi leaves no
doubt that there is human agency in this process. As Benjamin
Cardozo wrote, “We do not pick our rules of law full-blossomed
21
from the trees.”
Cases and principles don’t spontaneously “evolve.” Judges
and justices, for example, must frame the legal issues; decide
which cases are relevant to those issues; decide what those cases
19. Adrian Vermeule, Living it Up, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 2, 2010), http://
www.tnr.com/book/review/living-it (book review of GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S. KARLAN
& CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION (2010);
DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010)). In his review, Adrian
Vermeule dismisses it out of hand, to the extent that Strauss truly intended to analogize
common law decision-making to biological evolution. “Constitutional Darwinism is a
non-starter. . . . [T]he process by which constitutional precedents are selected for ongoing
life, or instead for overruling and death, cannot plausibly be described as a form of
natural selection.” Id. See also Scott Dodson, A Darwinist View of the Living
Constitution, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1319 (2008) (illustrating the weaknesses of the
metaphor). Vermeule, however, gives Strauss the benefit of the doubt, suggested that
Strauss likely “intends to suggest that constitutional law is intentionally adapted to
changing circumstances through incremental improvements by successive generations of
judges. This constitutional Burkeanism,” he concludes, “is a more serious business, and
Strauss’s view is entirely plausible.” Vermeule, supra.
20. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1972 ed.).
21. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 103 (1921).
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say; distinguish or overrule cases that point towards a different
answer or choose among lines of doctrine that might be in
tension. Just as judges and lawyers can disagree over the
conclusions to be drawn from sources of original understanding,
those attempting CLCI can disagree over the meaning of prior
cases and the proper level of abstraction at which those
principles should be derived. The answer to the next case is often
not found in the prior case. As Charles Fried put it,
[P]articularistic decisions, moved by the force of urgent
specifics, may for a time exert their influence in a case-by-case
accretion of precedents in similar circumstances, but their
influence cannot forever be exerted in this sideways fashion.
Eventually they either run out, or, if potent, they invite courts
to move to higher levels of abstraction, where more general
propositions are announced, and it is these that begin to take
22
over some of the work of deciding cases.

Because Strauss wants to convince readers that the common
law system “restrains judges more effectively than originalism
does” (p. 36), he seems deliberately to downplay the significant
discretion that judges have to interpret precedent, derive rules of
law from prior cases, cast them at a particular level of
abstraction, and apply them to controversies before them.
Alternatively, without overruling a prior case apparently on
point, a court can, as Karl Lewellyn pointed out, distinguish the
23
prior case by pointing to differences in the facts. He called this
“strict view” of precedent humorous, illustrating the concept by
reference to a case expressing a “rule hold[ing] only of
24
redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta Buick cars.” He
25
contrasted his strict view of precedent with a “loose view,”
which was:

22. CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT 189 (2004).
23. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 65–66
(10th prtg. 1996 ed.). Llewellyn wrote:
[I]t is clear that if a later court, in pondering a case substantially equivalent,
does not like the results achieved by the earlier court, then it may reach a
contrary decision in either of two ways. Either it may reject the rule laid down
by court number one; and this is not so likely. Or it may accept that rule as a
verbal formula, may cite the prior case as authority, and yet interpret the raw
evidence before it differently, saying that due to the difference in the facts, the
rule does not apply.
Id.
24. Id. at 72–73.
25. Id. at 74 (emphasis in original).

!!!DENNING-273-COMMONLAWCONSTITUTIONALINTERPRETATION2.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)11/17/2011 2:48 PM

2011]

BOOK REVIEWS

633

[T]he view that a court has decided, and decided author–
itatively, any points or all points on which it chose to rest a
case, or on which to chose [sic], after due argument, to pass.
No matter how broad the statement, no matter how
unnecessary on the facts or the procedural issues, if that was
26
the rule the court laid down, then that the court has held.

Llewellyn emphasized that the strict and loose views of
precedent were employed by lawyers and judges at the same
time to “get[] rid of precedents deemed troublesome and . . . for
27
making use of precedents that seem helpful.”
28
Strauss’s defense of Roe v. Wade in Chapter 4 is an
example of his quietism about the common law method. “A
plausible, precedent-based, common law case can be made for a
woman’s right to reproductive freedom,” he writes (p. 94). First,
he says, tradition holds that “people have the right to bodily
integrity” as well as “the right to control the composition of
one’s family” absent “extraordinary circumstances” (p. 94).
“Both these traditions reach far back into American law” (pp.
94–95). Because “it would hardly be controversial for the
Supreme Court to hold that the government may not invade
individuals’ bodily integrity by conducting medical experiments
on people against their will,” and because “a law that specified
that women of child-bearing age must become pregnant, if they
are physically able to do so, would . . . rais[e] serious constitutional issues,” despite the absence of language in the
Constitution prohibiting such laws, Roe is explicable by those
twin traditions of bodily integrity and the right to family
composition (p. 95). Q.E.D.
One problem, of course, is that is not how Roe “evolved.”
According to the Roe Court, the right to abortion was an aspect
of a larger “privacy” right that originated in Griswold v.
29
Connecticut. But the right annunciated in Griswold seemed
30
31
inextricably linked to marriage. It was Eisenstadt v. Baird that
26. Id. (emphasis in original).
27. Id.
28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
30. Justice Douglas’s opinion, for example, closed with the observation that the
case dealt with “a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights” and referred to marriage
“as a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred.” Id. at 486. Earlier, he wrote that “the very idea” of permitting
“the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use
of contraceptives” was “repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship.” Id. at 485–86.
31. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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severed the link between the privacy right and the marriage
relationship. Striking down Massachusetts’ prohibition on the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons (note the
difference between that law and the ban in Griswold on the use
of contraceptives), Justice Brennan wrote that “whatever the
rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the
rights must be the same for the unmarried and married alike. . . .
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
32
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”
Not only did Eisenstadt recast Griswold as a case about
individual rights, it recharacterized the right itself more
broadly—as a right of privacy that encompassed not merely the
right to make choices about becoming pregnant, but also the
right to bring a pregnancy to term or not. The Court never
explained why something that was true for married couples must
be ipso facto true for unmarried individuals. Nor did it justify the
expansion of the privacy right itself. As Charles Fried has noted,
Eisenstadt “casually slips in the word ‘bear,’ and so alludes to the
33
quite different and much more controversial issue of abortion.”
Roe itself then made use of “the subterranean passage Justice
34
Brennan had dug between contraception and abortion” further
expanding the privacy right in question, and holding that “[t]his
right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment[] . . . [or] in the Ninth Amendment . . . is broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
35
terminate her pregnancy.” As Fried notes, “[j]ust what
authority the Court was claiming for itself in Roe v. Wade and in
36
the name of what doctrine is hard to tell.” Whatever it was,
though, the decision and its reasoning was “a long way from the
37
truly anomalous Connecticut statute in Griswold.” The actual
story of Roe must stand as a warning to anyone inclined to take
seriously Strauss’s assurances about the constraining effects of
38
precedent and CLCI.
32. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
33. FRIED, supra note 22, at 191.
34. Id.
35. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
36. FRIED, supra note 22, at 193.
37. Id.
38. Nor is Roe necessarily an anomaly. Cases in less controversial areas than
abortion demonstrate how loosely cases can bind the Court. In Am. Ins. Ass’n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003), for example, the Court invalidated a California law that
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So much for how Roe actually came about. What about
Strauss’s attempt to shore up Roe’s foundation by reconstructing
it upon alleged legal “traditions” of bodily integrity and the right
to control family size? Strauss’s effort illustrates the point that
I’m making here: that his theory lacks an account of how to
choose among competing traditions (or lines of precedent) and
the appropriate level of abstraction at which to cast whatever
tradition or precedent is chosen.
I can think of at least four exceptions to the bodily integrity
and the controlling-family-size traditions Strauss invokes. First,
there is the Draft. Government can require its (male) citizens
literally to put their life on the line for the country or face
imprisonment. Second is mandatory vaccination. In Jacobson v.
Massachusetts the Court held that mandatory vaccination against
smallpox violated neither the letter nor the spirit of the
39
Constitution. Rejecting the argument that the statute was an
infringement of personal liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court responded with a reference to
conscription:
The liberty secured by the 14th Amendment . . . consists, in
part, in the right of a person ‘to live and work where he will’;
and yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his
will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary
interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take
his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the
chance of being shot down in its defense. It is not, therefore,
true that the power of the public to guard itself against
imminent danger depends in every case involving the control
of one’s body upon his willingness to submit to reasonable
regulations established by the constituted authorities, under

required insurance companies doing business in the state to disclose Holocaust-era
policies issued in Europe by companies or their affiliates. The Court found that the state
law conflicted with the executive branch’s policy that conflicts over such insurance
policies be settled by an international commission. As Mike Ramsey and I showed,
though, the cases cited in support of the Court’s decision were distinguishable; moreover,
the Court neglected to discuss relevant precedents that cut against its decision. Brannon
P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and
Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 874–85 (2004).
We concluded that “[t]he foreign affairs cases on which Garamendi purported to rely
simply do not involve close readings of prior cases and applications of the existing rules
and doctrines to new facts.” Id. at 894. The case, we argued, was “powerful evidence that
the Court’s prior . . . decisions do not constrain it, or indeed even meaningfully inform its
subsequent decisions.” Id. at 896.
39. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905) (“Whatever may be thought
of the expediency of this statute, it cannot be affirmed to be, beyond question, in palpable conflict with the Constitution.”).
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the sanction of the state, for the purpose of protecting the
40
public collectively against such danger.

Though it is in bad odor, the Court has never formally
41
overruled Buck v. Bell, which rejected a constitutional
challenge to forced sterilization of the “feeble-minded.” Citing
Jacobson, Justice Holmes wrote that “[t]he principle that
sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting
the Fallopian tubes,” adding infamously that “[t]hree
42
generations of imbeciles are enough.” Finally, there is abortion
itself: after viability (and even in the third trimester under the
old Roe framework), states may proscribe abortion altogether
(with exceptions to preserve the life and health of the mother),
thus forcing a woman to bring the child to term and endure both
the physical discomfort that attends the last weeks of pregnancy
as well as the pain of birth. It is also worth noting that the
statutes on the books limiting or banning abortions when Roe
was decided constituted an additional exception to those
traditions.
Given the existence of those exceptions, how is a judge
supposed to choose among the competing traditions? Strauss’s
only response, repeated throughout the book, is that judges
sometimes need to apply “fairness and good policy” to update
the law (e.g., pp. 36, 38). But how? If the choice among competing traditions is made by judges applying fairness and good
policy, it is difficult to see how either precedent or CLCI constitutes even a mild fetter on the Court or how it provides
transparency and candor as compared to originalism.
Given that Strauss seeks to prove the superiority of CLCI to
originalism, it is surprising that he has so little to say about the
mechanics of his methodology. Analogies and metaphors are no
substitute for a careful description of the common law method
itself and the judge’s role in it. By not doing so, he leaves the
impression it is something of “a machine that would go of itself,”
43
to borrow Michael Kammen’s description of the Constitution,
whereby principles evolve and emerge ready-made for judicial
application. When law runs out, well, the judge stands ready with
fairness and sound policy, thereby moving the law ad astra per

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 29–30 (citations omitted).
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
Id. at 207.
See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986).
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44

aspera. By glossing over the choices made in a common law
system, Strauss makes CLCI sound like sweet reason itself,
especially when compared to the caricatured originalism Strauss
deploys as CLCI’s foil.
B. IMPLICIT JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
CLCI is a theory that assumes judicial supremacy—that the
Supreme Court is the authoritative interpreter of the
Constitution and that its decisions bind other governmental
actors, who are not free to adopt conflicting interpretations. As
Adrian Vermeule put it in his review of Strauss’s book, “Strauss
has not fully worked through the basic question of why, under
[CLCI], the legal system will work best overall if judges have the
power to review and overturn legislative action” and that
“constitutional theory should have better foundations than” the
45
ones Strauss provides. “Strauss describes the common-law
method,” Vermeule notes, “in terms that make it sound
46
distinctively judicial.”
This assumption enables Strauss to sidestep a substantial
objection to his theory: that the common law model is
inappropriate in a system where judicial decisions are not
amenable to reversal by ordinary legislative majorities. Because
judicial decisions are a kind of one-way ratchet, one might argue
that CLCI has undemocratic and counter-majoritarian effects.
As noted above, however, Strauss’s response is to shrug and say
that if there is a problem it is with constitutionalism in general
47
and judicial review in particular, not with CLCI. But this
response seems to conflate constitutionalism with judiciallyenforced constitutions and judicial review with judicial
supremacy. Strauss’s theory places courts—the Supreme Court
in particular—squarely in the interpretive driver’s seat. As
Vermeule suggests, Strauss assumes that readers will accept on
faith that courts are better suited than other branches to perform
this role.
CLCI’s juriscentrism is confirmed by recalling Strauss’s list
of things that “we would have to give up if we were all to
44. The phrase is usually translated, “To the stars through adversity.”
45. Vermeule, supra note 19. For a project similar to Strauss’s, which does attempt
a defense of strong-form judicial review, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,
JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2009). For
Strauss’s defense, see supra Part I.D.
46. Vermeule, supra note 19.
47. See supra Part I.D.
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become originalists” (p. 12). Conceding that Strauss is right that
the original understanding of the Constitution compelling those
48
results, however, would not mean that discrimination,
malapportioned legislatures, or what have you would be fixed in
the Constitution. At most it might mean that courts would be
unable to effect changes. Federal, state, and local legislatures
would be free to enact protections for groups not explicitly
protected in the United States Constitution. For example, the
Constitution has not been interpreted by courts to require
barring employment discrimination based on sexual orientation;
but state and local governments have stepped in to provide such
49
protections. In an earlier article, Strauss himself argued that
even without the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause, race discrimination would likely have ended eventually
50
anyway. There is also the possibility that the Constitution
would be amended to force change. Though Strauss argues that
CLCI produces the only meaningful constitutional change in our
system, evidence exists that Article V has provided meaningful,
51
durable constitutional change in the past. Moreover, it could be
that in the absence of robust judicial review Article V would
have produced more constitutional change than it has to date.
C. A CARICATURED ORIGINALISM
Strauss defines originalism as “the view that constitutional
provisions mean what the people who adopted them—in the
1790s or 1860s or whenever—understood them to mean” (p. 3).
Later, he claims that originalists “insist[] that the original
understandings of constitutional provisions provide answers to
every dispute about what the Constitution requires” (p. 25).
Originalism, he writes elsewhere, confines us to the Framers’
specific judgments, rather than “leaving [judges] free to interpret
the [Constitution’s] general provisions” (p. 114).

48. To take one example from his list, conventional scholarly wisdom now holds,
pace Strauss, that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment likely intended at least
some (if not all) of the Bill of Rights to be protected. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS,
NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS (1986).
49. For a list of states having public accommodations statutes that include sexual
orientation as a protected class, see Elizabeth R. Cayton, Comment, Equal Access to
Health Care: Sexual Orientation and State Public Accommodation Antidiscrimination
Statutes, 19 L. & SEXUALITY 193, 195 n.15 (2010).
50. See Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, supra note 7, at
1484.
51. Denning & Vile, supra note 12.
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But I am aware of few originalist scholars who believe that
the Court must apply original understanding in an unmediated
form. Or who believe that that original understanding is a kind
of judicial algorithm that produces answers to contemporary
constitutional controversies. Strauss certainly does not name
one—a silence facilitated by the lack of footnotes or a list of
sources at the end of the book.
Strauss’s crabbed description of originalism ignores the
outpouring of recent literature expressing a variety of views on
what counts as sources of meaning for ascertaining the original
52
understanding of constitutional provisions. In contrast to earlier
originalist theories that seemed to privilege the views of the
53
Framers, much recent originalism scholarship endorses what it
terms “the original public understanding,” based on, among
other things, contemporary usage, in addition to the usual
sources, such as the records from the Philadelphia Convention,
state ratifying conventions, the records of the Reconstruction
54
Congress, and the like.
His insistence that originalists expect specific answers to
contemporary constitutional questions similarly elides the
distinction between the fixing of constitutional meaning and the
extrapolation of doctrinal rules implementing that meaning—
between what Mitchell Berman has termed “constitutional
55
operative propositions” and “decision rules.” Take the Equal
Rights Amendment as an example. Strauss claims that no
understandings emerged in the debates over that amendment on
questions such as whether the ERA would outlaw single-sex
56
education. For Strauss, this “proves” that originalism is
unworkable because history often fails to provide ready-made
answers to controversies that arise later. Leaving aside for a
moment whether “understandings” about the ERA materialized
57
or not, Strauss is conflating the use of originalism to fix
52. For a good, if critical, summary, see Mitchell Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
53. For a clever critique of this earlier originalism, see Boris I. Bittker, The
Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent: The Recent Past, 77 CALIF. L. REV.
235 (1989).
54. See generally Symposium, Original Ideas on Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
491 (2009).
55. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004);
see also Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What
the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005); see generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001).
56. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
57. The evidence suggests that understandings did emerge that the results Strauss
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constitutional meaning and the implementation of that meaning
through judicial doctrine. As Mitchell Berman has
demonstrated, however one arrives at constitutional meaning,
there is still a second step in which courts have to fashion tools
that enable judges to use that meaning in the resolution of
58
specific cases. Even provisions with self-evident meaning (e.g.,
59
Presidents must be at least thirty-five years old ) cannot be
directly applied—courts have to apply some decision rule
60
specifying whether the age threshold has been met. Few
originalists would claim that to fashion doctrinal rules to render
original understanding useful is to abandon original
61
understanding.
Strauss’s claim that originalists are committed to the
Framers’ specific applications of their principles is also false. As
Mitchell Berman notes in an article otherwise harshly critical of
originalism, “the only commentators who take [original
application originalism] seriously are those aiming to attack it.
Leading originalists have unambiguously repudiated it for
62
years.”
To be fair, Strauss confesses to presenting an unnuanced
picture of originalism (pp. 10–11), defending his presentation on
mentions were possible under the ERA, and that possibility played a significant role in
its eventual defeat. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995 at 410–11 (1996) (discussing the concerns raised by
opponents of ERA regarding, inter alia, unisex bathrooms and assurances provided by
supporters that the ERA would not have mandated such things); RICHARD B.
BERNSTEIN WITH JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE
CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 142–43 (1993)
(describing “insistent repetition of alleged horrors that ERA, interpreted by an ‘ultraliberal’ Court, might foster: drafting women into combat forces, unisex bathrooms,
homosexual marriages, and the like. . . . [T]he parade of horribles . . . tainted ERA
beyond repair”).
58. Further, it is hard to see that CLCI is a marked improvement on this score.
After all, the common law method requires judges to extract principles from a case or
group of cases for prospective application. See supra notes 28–44 and accompanying text.
59. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
60. Berman says that the default rule is “preponderance of the evidence.” Berman,
supra note 55, at 11, 68.
61. Randy Barnett, who is an originalist, has likewise distinguished between
constitutional “interpretation” and constitutional “construction,” which describes roughly
the same distinction between fixing meaning and operationalizing that meaning through
judicial doctrine. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 118–30 (2004). Even older originalists, like Robert Bork,
recognized that “‘most doctrine is merely the judge-made superstructure that implements
basic constitutional principles’” and was in no way inconsistent with originalism. ROBERT
H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 167
(1990) (quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J.,
concurring)).
62. Berman, supra note 52, at 28.
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the grounds that with originalism, it’s all or nothing. Some
practitioners, he notes, “actually define ‘original meaning’ in a
way that ends up making originalism indistinguishable from a
63
form of living constitutionalism” (pp. 10–11). Strauss argues
that those, like Justice Scalia, who declare themselves to be
“fainthearted originalist[s],” and would, for example, permit
well-entrenched precedent to trump original understanding, are
not really originalists either and that such concessions are fatal
to originalism (p. 17). Strauss writes, “if following a theory
consistently would make you a nut, isn’t that a problem with the
theory?” (p. 17). The problem with soft originalism “is that it
gives away most of the qualities that purported to make
originalism appealing in the first place,” like the constraint of
individual discretion (p. 17). If you concede you would abandon
it sometimes, then questions arise: “When?” and “What do you
employ instead of originalism?” He writes that “[t]he
challenge . . . is to answer these questions without making
yourself vulnerable to the same objections that are routinely
leveled against living constitutionalism: when push comes to
shove, you’re just going to do what seems right to you, instead of
following the law” (p. 17).
But this objection can be turned back on CLCI itself. For
example, in Chapter 5 Strauss concedes that it is at times good
and right that we follow text or original understanding. Yet, he
does not suggest that his concession is fatal to his theory or
makes him any less committed to CLCI. Moreover, those like
Justice Scalia who admit a willingness to abandon originalism on
occasion do so in the name of stare decisis, something one would
think Strauss would applaud given both his fears that originalism
would result in all the terrible things he lists in Chapter 1 as well
as his belief that it’s good for the Court to follow precedent.
Originalism, like the Constituton itself, need not be a suicide
pact.
D. ON THE UNDESIRABILITY AND IMPOSSIBILITY OBJECTIONS
Strauss’s main objections to originalism—that it is both
undesirable and impossible—are both overdrawn and even
contradict one another. First, if the Framers’ intentions are truly
unknowable, then it makes no sense to indict originalism on
64
consequentialist grounds as he does in Chapter 1. The
63.
64.

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.
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normative argument that originalism would produce undesirable
results must assume that those are, in fact, outcomes produced
by the original understanding. But if original intent or original
understanding is beyond the grasp of scholars, lawyers, and
judges, then no such outcomes are possible or plausible.
Strauss also cites the dead-hand objection as another of
originalism’s normatively undesirable consequences. But I’m not
sure I really understand this objection. Adhering to precedent
seems to involve no less of a submission to the past than
adherence to the original understanding of constitutional
provisions. We obey statutes that were written a long time ago as
well. Strauss distinguishes stare decisis from originalism by
claiming proponents of the latter do so out of quasi-religious or
mystical ancestor worship, while he would respect precedent on
pragmatic grounds. But adherents of originalism, no less than
proponents of CLCI, could similarly ground their theory.
Originalists might claim that it makes sense to resolve the
tension between judicial review and democracy by curbing
judicial discretion in exercise of the former by hewing closely to
the original understanding of constitutional provisions. That
way, the argument runs, you can be sure that you enforce the
Constitution while reducing the instances of interference with
policy choices made by elected officials. No mystical or quasireligious veneration is required! The only requirement is just a
belief that Article VI’s reference to “this Constitution” means
the one written and ratified in 1789 (or 1791 or 1868), not what
one wishes it meant or would like it to mean today. Moreover,
since Strauss himself concedes that it is sometimes necessary or
useful to follow text, his dead-hand objection could be expanded
to condemn constitutionalism in toto. To the extent it does, it
surely proves too much, as Madison himself pointed out to
Jefferson, who thought constitutions ought to expire every
generation or so.
As for the impossibility critique: saying that recovery of
original understanding is impossible is a pretty radical attack on
the historical enterprise. What Strauss really means is that it is
impossible for lawyers and judges to do so, which might be recast
as an institutional competence objection. Granted, most lawyers
and judges are not trained historians, but that does not mean
either that (1) their efforts to do history are designed to hide
policy preferences, or (2) that CLCI is superior because it
“requires judges and lawyers to be, well, judges and lawyers” (p.
43).
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Strauss also objects that were original understandings within
our capabilities, they would still not help, because they don’t
answer the questions that come up in litigation. As noted above,
this collapses any distinction between constitutional meaning
and the doctrinal rules to implement that meaning, denies that
the formulation of doctrinal rules is compatible with originalism,
or both. Moreover, CLCI is hardly an improvement. Knowing
that Griswold v. Connecticut held that states could not prohibit
married couples from using contraceptives tells a court nothing
about the state’s ability to prohibit the sale of contraceptives to
65
unmarried persons, or whether the state can regulate the sexual
66
morality of its citizens.
E. COMPARING CLCI AND ORIGINALISM
It is difficult to tell whether CLCI is more workable than
originalism, because it is not clear, exactly, what CLCI involves.
Saying that it allows lawyers and judges to be lawyers and judges
is, of course, tautological. Similarly, if you reject the Jeffersonian
“dead hand” argument—or at least if you fail to see why
precedent is not as subject to that argument as originalism, you
might question whether CLCI is clearly superior on justifiability
as well.
On descriptive superiority, however, Strauss seems to be on
stronger ground. There is no doubt that most Supreme Court
opinions on constitutional questions do not start—and have not
started—by reasoning from originalist first principles. Opinions
67
like District of Columbia v. Heller are the exception, rather
than the rule. More common are opinions like the ones in, say,
68
Gonzales v. Raich, in which the majority and the dissenting
opinions jousted over which precedents were most relevant to
the resolution of the issue before the Court. And Strauss is
certainly correct that First Amendment doctrine has moved

65. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
66. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring), and id. at 505 (White, J., concurring) (assuming that it can), with Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571, 577 (2003) (holding that morality alone is an insufficient
justification for regulating consensual same-sex sexual activity).
67. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the Second
Amendment guarantees an individual right to private gun ownership for self-defense;
invalidating the District of Columbia’s gun control ordinance that made illegal ownership
of a handgun for self-defense).
68. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (sustaining the application of the
Controlled Substances Act to non-commercial, locally-grown possession and consumption of marijuana for medical purposes, as permitted by state law).
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afield of the Framers’ likely intended application of the
69
Amendment. Still, “ought” does not necessarily follow from
“is.” It still remains to be proven that CLCI produces better or
more accurate results over the run of cases, according to some
70
measure, than originalism does.
I have my doubts whether CLCI would result in more
candid opinions as well. Perhaps the common law method would
be an improvement if judges would signal that lines of precedent
did not control, or were in tension, and thus a decision would be
made according to notions of fairness and good policy. But I
cannot think of a majority Supreme Court opinion on a
contentious issue that has said so. More common are disingenuously broad readings of cases that ignore limiting
language or, conversely, parsimonious readings that Llewellyn
mocked as announcing a principle that applies only to redheaded Walpoles driving pale magenta Buicks. Seeing such
behavior, I am occasionally as inclined to view case law as a fig
leaf for a preferred outcome as Strauss is suspicious of the “law
office” history allegedly accompanying originalist opinions. At
the very least, it is rarely clear which precedents control,
particularly when lines of precedent are in tension with one
another, if they don’t flatly conflict.
CONCLUSION
The Living Constitution is written for a general, not a
specialized, audience. I would highly recommend it as an
antidote to some simplistic popular critiques of the Supreme
Court. As is his hallmark, Strauss’s writing is clear and concise.
His logic and argumentation are downright seductive.
However, the verdict on CLCI as an, or the, alternative
contender to theories of original understanding will have to
await a more complete treatment. I close with three suggestions
for that future work. First, a more precise description of the
common law method is essential. Strauss seems to assume that
there is only one such method and that lawyers will, to coin a
phrase, “know it when they see it.” But metaphors involving
evolution and talk of the wisdom of the ages obscure the myriad
choices that judges have when framing issues, choosing among

69.
70.

See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
For doubts about the ability of CLCI to deliver on its epistemic claims, see
VERMEULE, supra note 18.
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lines of relevant precedent, synthesizing those precedents in that
line into legal principles, and applying those principles.
Second, I agree with Adrian Vermeule that the judicial
supremacy on which CLCI depends demands a stronger defense.
Why is it that courts, the Supreme Court in particular, are
institutionally capable of identifying, transmitting, and updating
high constitutional principles? Why is it not fatal to the common
law analogy that common law courts were subject to reversal by
legislatures?
Finally, Strauss should eschew the straw man originalism
invoked in The Living Constitution in favor of the original
understanding theories that scholars actually propound. He
should at least be able to cite originalist scholars who subscribe
to a version of originalism that, for example, expects history to
dictate the precise outcomes of current cases.

